Italian Invasion of Egypt - Part 2

The campaign

The British anticipated an Italian invasion of Egypt soon after the declaration of war between the Italian Empire and the British Commonwealth. The British assumption for planning their defense of Egypt was centered on an Italian thrust into Egypt along the coast which would have as its first objective the town and port of Mersa Matruh, one hundred and sixty-five miles from the Libyan-Egyptian frontier.

The village contained the British forward logistical base for the British forces operating along the Egyptian- Libyan frontier. This base was also located at the end of the transportation network from the Nile Delta, and contained a rail-head and the end of the hard surface road.

The territory between Mersa Matruh and the border was open desert bordered by an escarpment ten miles inland from the sea. Between the coast and the escarpment was one coastal trail formed by the natural geography of the territory. To the south was the desert, with a number of trails. The desert west, east, and south of Mersa Matruh was ideal for mechanized maneuver and attack. Only at one small point between the frontier and Mersa Matruh there was a natural obstacle to mechanized warfare. This was where the escarpment meets the coast at a small town called Sollum. Here was a narrow passageway from the desert plains that ran down the escarpment into Sollum. It could be bypassed by traveling south of the escarpment but was a strategic location due to the bottleneck that it formed along the coastal road. Even so this location could be outflanked to the south by mechanized forces moving wide through Sidi Ornar. Mersa Matruh also could be attacked on a number of axes of advance and was the logical choice to be the first objective of an Italian invasion.

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11 June 1940

All three squadrons from the 11th Hussars crossed the frontier wire and attacked Italian outposts, Italian patrols, and set up ambushes along the entire frontier with Egypt. The Italian military forces responded to these mechanized raids by forming their own mechanized combined arms teams or raggruppamento. These combined arms team consisted of battalion and company sized elements task organized into motorized infantry, motorized artillery and light tank raggruppamento.

14 June 1940

The Italians suffered the loss of two strategic frontier outposts, Fort Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena.

16 June 1940

The first tank action to occur between the Italian armor and British armor was conducted between an Italian raggruppamento and elements of the British 7th Armored division. The entire strength of the Italian raggruppamento was one Libyan motorized battalion, elements of one L.3 light tank battalion and a motorized artillery section. The raggruppamento's armored element came from the IX light tank battalion. The 3rd company, supported by another platoon from the Battalion headquarters, was task organized as part of the raggruppamento. This would give the raggruppamento strength of 16 L.3 light tanks. The motorized Libyan infantry element for the raggruppamento came from the 1st Libyan Infantry Division. The artillery section for the raggruppamento came from the Libyan 17th battery, IV Group and was armed with 4x 77/28 artillery pieces. This raggruppamento formed itself with the available equipment and personnel in the Bardia area. The main failures of these initial combined arms columns or raggruppamento were in training, equipment, and their doctrinal use.

6 July 1940

The first 72 M.11 medium tanks arrived in North Africa. They came from the Ariete Armored Division and were sent as two separate battalions, I and II Medium Tank battalions.

15 July 1940

The first date for the invasion of Egypt was to coincide with the German invasion of England. Planning was conducted and called for the stripping of all the trucks from the Italian 5th Army and using the just arriving Italian M.11 medium tanks. This invasion did not materialize due to the fact the Germans did not invade Great Britain even though it made good tactical sense based on the current conditions and strength of the opposing armies in July 1940.

5 August 1940

First engagement in which the Italians employed their M.11 tanks against British armor. A small Raggruppamento composed of one platoon of motorcycle Bersaglieri, artillery, a company LJ tanks and a company of M.11/39 tanks engaged a British column formed by armored cars, tanks and artillery. The Italians won the engagement capturing two British tanks and destroying two other British tanks.

22 August 1940

Second date for the invasion of Egypt. For this date there was a second operational level plan developed by Marshal Graziani and his staff. This plan called for a limited advance and its objective would be the city of Sollum. This plan had the Italian limit of advance to east of Sollum, with a point north of Shawni el Aujerin. This would have three primary forces advancing on three separate axes. Only after securing his initial objectives would he advance to Sidi Barrani, if warranted by success. This plan was limited in nature and only could be considered a limited operation. The Italian binary non-motorized infantry divisions were assigned the only road network available to them. Due to the summer heat in August, which would have affected the primarily non- motorized Italian formations, it was postponed for the second time.

29 August 1940

The Italian 10th army formed the Comando carri della Libia. This command consisted of three separate raggruppamenti. The first was that of Colonel Aresca with I medium Tank battalion, 31st, 61st and 62nd light tank battalions. The second commanded by Colonel Antonio Trivioli, consisted of II medium tank battalion (M.11), less one company, 9th, 20th, and 61st light tank battalions. The third was the mixed Colonel Maletti tank battalion with the 60th light tank battalion and the remaining company from the II medium tank battalion.

9 September 1940

The third operational level plan was for this planned date for the invasion. Graziani had defined his new objective of Sidi Barrani. Two separate forces attacking on two separate axis of advance would make this attack. The Metropolitan Italian non-motorized divisions would advance along the coast and attack through Halfaya Pass and occupy Sollum and continue forward to Sidi Barrani. The southern column consisting of the Libyan Divisions and Maletti's raggruppamento were to advance on the Dayr al-Hamra Bir ar Rabiyah - Bir Enba track to flank the escarpment and the enemy. According to this plan, Maletti's raggruppamento was intended to make a long flanking movement through the desert. However Marshal Graziani's staff failed to provide the proper maps and navigation equipment needed to work deep in the desert. Moving to its assembly point for the invasion, the Maletti raggruppamento got lost and the XXIII Corps Headquarters had to send aircraft out to their location and help lead his units into their positions. Additionally the Libyan divisions, which were to accompany him, took an unconscionable time to rendezvous near Fort Capuzzo. These developments and the fact that Marshal Graziani believed that the material prerequisites underlying his operational plan were still lacking sufficient trucks, and transport aircraft, as well as command of the space changed the plan again.

13 September 1940

The fourth plan developed by Graziani and his staff was for the planned invasion of 13 September 1940. Graziani still defined as his objective Sidi Barrani and points south. The Italian 10th Army consisting of five divisions and the armored elements would advance in mass down the coast road. They would occupy Sollum and advance to Sidi Barrani through Buq-Buq. Due to what he thought were his Army's failings to adequately implement the third plan he decided on an advance in mass. He intended to advance to Sidi Barrani, consolidate his holdings, resupply his army, destroy any British counter attacks and then resume the advance to Mersa Matruh. On the morning of the 13th of September, 1940 the great Italian invasion of Egypt began. General Annibale Bergonzoli, commander of XXIII Corps, advanced to Sidi Barrani along the coastal road with his non-motorized and motorized formations. The XXIII corps was given enough trucks to partially motorize three infantry divisions for the advance but could only fully motorize one infantry division. General Bergonzoli wanted to advance with the 1st raggruppamento carri as the advance guard, two motorized infantry divisions on line, one motorized infantry division in reserve, two Libyan non-motorized infantry divisions on foot and the Maletti raggruppamento in the rear. The motorized formations were the partially motorized 62nd Cirene infantry division, the partially motorized 63rd Marmarica infantry division, the fully motorized 23 Marzo CCNN division, the Maletti raggruppamento and the 1st raggruppamento carri. The partially motorized infantry divisions would move in shuttle fashion. The non-motorized infantry had to march sixty miles to the objective. During the advance into Egypt, the 1st Raggruppamento carri was kept in reserve, except for the LXII L.3 light tank battalion assigned to the 63rd Marmarica Infantry division and LXIII L.3 light tank battalion assigned to 62nd Cirene infantry division. The 2nd raggruppamento carri was located at Bardia, except for the IX L.3 light tank battalion assigned to 2nd Libyan infantry division. The II M.11 medium tank battalion was with Raggruppamento Maletti but the Maletti raggruppamento only had three Libyan infantry battalions for the attack, but these were fully motorized to carry its infantry. The invasion started with an artillery barrage followed by an advance behind a rolling barrage. The Italians took and occupied their first objective, which was Sollum. Then over the next four days the Italian Army advanced along the coast with two divisions leading behind a screen of motorcyclist, tanks, and motorized infantry and artillery. On 14 September, what remained of the 1st raggruppamento carri, in reserve under 10th Army HQ was following the advancing 1st and 2nd Libyan divisions toward Bir Thidan el-Khadim. At Alam el Dab right before Sidi Barrani, about 50 Italian tanks supported by motorized infantry and artillery attempted to outflank and surround the British rear guard. This flanking maneuver forced the British forces to retreat.

16 September 1940

On the evening of this day, the 1st raggruppamento carri was east-southeast of Sidi Barrani, along with the 23 Marzo division and all the artillery of XXIII Corps. Raggruppamento Maletti was still west of the objective. Raggruppamento Maletti was not able to fully participate in the offensive because of various logistical and organizational problems it was dealing with during the advance. The 1st raggruppamento carri was used only in a prudent infantry support role. The Italian army was only able to advance twelve miles each day based on the non-motorized elements it contained. Once reaching Sidi Barrani, its primary objective, it halted and began to develop a series of well-fortified camps. The British had expected the Italians to make a flanking movement well south of the coast and had concentrated most of their small forces south of the escarpment. Only one Coldstream motorized infantry battalion and some artillery were on the coast to oppose the main weight of the Italian invasion. This force fought a delaying action against the advancing Italians. The main armor strength of 7th Armored division was located at Mersa Matruh. The British strength in Cruiser tanks was only eighty five, of which fifteen were out of action undergoing repair. Mersa Matruh is where the British thought the Italians were going to advance and they planned to defend there, and utilize their mechanized forces against the Italian flanks and long lines of communication, which the Italians would have to maintain. But the Italians stopped at Sidi Barrani and established a series of fortified positions.

21 September 1940

The Italian medium armor strength was relatively intact after the advance to Sidi Barrani. On this date were still 68 M.11 tanks out of the original 72 shipped to North Africa. From these 68 M.11 tanks 31 were unserviceable due to maintenance and the others 37 distributed between the two tank battalions. 1st medium tank battalion had 9 serviceable and 23 unserviceable. The 2nd medium tank battalion had 28 serviceable and 8 unserviceable.

18 November 1940

The Comando carri della Libia is transformed into Brigata Corazzata, the Babini Armored Brigade. The elements assigned to this organisation were: I medium tank battalion (M-11 tanks), II medium tank battalion (M.13) tanks, 1 motorised bersaglieri regiment, 1 motorcycle battalion, 2 antitank companies (47/32 antitank guns mounted on trucks), 1 artillery regiment with 1 battalion of 75/27 guns, 1 battalion of 100/17 guns, 1 battery of 75CK anti-aircraft guns and 2 batteries of 20mm anti-aircraft guns.